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The Hague Dialogues
Abstract
Imagine the following scenario: A young scholar from Vilna, having wandered through several cities in Eastern
Europe and Germany arrived in the city of the Hague at the close of the 1780s, enjoyed the material support
of the richest family of Jewish merchants in the city, the Boaz family, and sought and gained the religious
approval of the rabbi of the city, Judah Leib Mezerich. His name was Pinhas Elijah ben Meir Hurwitz
(1765-1821) and he was about to complete the first draft of a manuscript of his soon-to-be published book,
an encyclopedia of the sciences entitled Sefer ha-Brit (The Book of the Covenant).1 The young Hurwitz soon
learned of the presence of an aging sage who lived in the city, a rigorous philosopher and émigré from Mainz,
Naphtali Herz Ulman (1731-87). Ulman had completed a multi-volume philosophic opus of which only the
first volume, Hokhmat ha-shorashim [The Science of Roots or First Principles], had been published in 1781.2
Hurwitz was hardly a philosopher in his own right; in fact he had been drawn to the study of the kabbalah. But
he did share something in common with Ulman — an appreciation of the life of the mind and particularly a
fascination for the natural world and the new sciences, and they were both Ashkenazic Jews with knowledge of
the German language.3 It seemed natural that Hurwitz would seek out Ulman and converse with the major
intellectual figure of Hague Jewry.
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The Hague Dialogues*
DAVID RUDERMAN
IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO: A young scholar from Vilna,  having wandered through several cities in Eastern Europe and Ger-
many arrived in the city of the Hague at the close of the 1780s, enjoyed 
the material support of the richest family of Jewish merchants in the city, 
the Boaz family, and sought and gained the religious approval of the 
rabbi of the city, Judah Leib Mezerich. His name was Pinhas Elijah ben 
Meir Hurwitz (1765-1821) and he was about to complete the first draft of 
a manuscript of his soon-to-be published book, an encyclopedia of the 
sciences entitled Sefer ha-Brit (The Book of the Covenant).1 The young 
Hurwitz soon learned of the presence of an aging sage who lived in the 
city, a rigorous philosopher and émigré from Mainz, Naphtali Herz 
Ulman (1731-87). Ulman had completed a multi-volume philosophic 
opus of which only the first volume, Hokhmat ha-shorashim [The Sci-
ence of Roots or First Principles], had been published in 1781.2 Hurwitz 
* In honor of my dear friend Yosef Kaplan, master of the history of Dutch Jewry and the 
Western Sephardic Diaspora, brilliant teacher, and generous colleague. 
1. On Hurwitz, see Ira Robinson, ‘Kabbalah and Science in Sefer ha-Berit: A Modernization 
Strategy for Orthodox Jews,’ Modern Judaism 9 (1989), p. 275-288; Noah Rosenblum, ‘The First 
Hebrew Encyclopedia: Its Author and Development (Hebrew),’ Proceedings of the American Academy 
for Jewish Research 55 (1988), p. 15-65: David Ruderman, ‘Some Jewish Responses to Smallpox Preven-
tion in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: A new Perspective on the Moderniza-
tion of European Jewry,’ Aleph 2 (2002), p. 111-144; Resianne Fontaine, ‘Natural Science in Sefer 
ha-Berit: Pinchas Hurwitz on Animals and Meteorological Phenomena,’ in Resianne Fontaine, 
Andrea Schatz, and Irene Zwiep (eds), Sepharad in Ashkenaz: Medieval Knowledge and Eighteenth-
Century Enlightened Jewish Discourse (Amsterdam 2007), p. 157-181; Resianne Fontaine, ‘Love of One’s 
Neighbour in Pinhas Hurwitz’s Sefer ha-Berit’, in Martin F.J. Baaesten and Reinier Munk (eds), 
Studies in Hebrew Literature and Jewish Culture Present to Albert van der Heide on the Occasion of his 
Sixty-Fifth Birthday, Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought 12 (Dordrecht 2007), p. 271-295. 
2. On Ulman, see the following: Alexander Even-Chen, Haskalah, pragmatizm, ve-emunah: 
mishnato ha-philosophit shel Naphtali Herz Ulman (PhD thesis, Hebrew University, 1992); Zvi Mala-
chi, ‘N.H. Ulman, Maskil and Philosopher’, Studies on the History of Dutch Jewry 2 (1979), p. 77-88 
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was hardly a philosopher in his own right; in fact he had been drawn to 
the study of the kabbalah. But he did share something in common with 
Ulman – an appreciation of the life of the mind and particularly a fasci-
nation for the natural world and the new sciences, and they were both 
Ashkenazic Jews with knowledge of the German language.3 It seemed 
natural that Hurwitz would seek out Ulman and converse with the major 
intellectual figure of Hague Jewry. 
It may have been a likely scenario but one that probably was never 
realized. Despite his relatively young age, Ulman died in 1787 at the age 
of 56.4 Hurwitz, according to the testimony of Mezerich was living in 
The Hague in 1790 and had been residing there for at least a full year.5 
If indeed, he had arrived in 1789, he had missed his opportunity to 
engage with the formidable philosopher who had resided in Holland for 
more than fifteen years. If only they had had a chance to meet, one 
might have imagined a lively, animated, and even contentious conversa-
tion between the two. Ulman was thirty years older than Hurwitz and 
that difference in age genuinely revealed an enormous generation gap in 
their intellectual styles and in the values and aspirations they held for 
themselves and their communities. The Sefer ha-Brit was first published 
in 1797 in Brunn, only sixteen years after Ulman’s single Hebrew publi-
cation, but the difference in the two works-along with the numerous 
volumes Ulman left in manuscript but never published – is astounding. 
If one were to chart the transformation of Jewish thought from one 
 generation to another, these two thinkers would provide meaningful 
(in Hebrew); Shalom Rosenberg and Alexander Even-Chen, ‘Philosophical Letters at the End of the 
Eighteenth Century: Naphtali Herz Ulman and Moses Mendelssohn’, Iyyun 43 (1994), p. 209-220 
(in Hebrew); Fred van Lieburg, ‘On Naphtali Herz Ulman’s Biography and the Reception of His 
Works in the Netherlands’, Zutot 3 (2003), p. 58-65; Alexander Even-Chen, ‘Ulman Herz (Hartog 
Ulman) (1731-87)’, in W. van Bunge (ed.), The Dictionary of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century 
Dutch Philosophers, 2 vols (Bristol 2003), 2:1003-1006; Reinier Munk, ‘Naftali Herz Ulman, een 
vroege maskil’ (Inaugural Address, Leiden 2003). 
3. Hurwitz’s knowledge of German, which he does not acknowledge, seems plausible because 
of a recently discovered letter signed by Hurwitz to the well-known censor of Hebrew books, Karl 
Fischer. Professor Michael Silber made the discovery and I thank him for sharing the letter with me. 
Karl Fischer Archives, Epistolae rabbinorum aliorumque Hebraeorum ab. A. 5549 (1789) usque 5594 (1836) 
ad me Carolum Fischer etc. National Library of the Czech Republic, Prague, Call No. XVIII.F.11, 
fols 256-266. 
4. He was buried on June 22, 1787, having died of a stroke. See Van Lieburg, ‘On Naphtali 
Herz’s Ulman’s Biography’, p. 61. 
5. See note 1 above. 
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markers of some continuity but more of radical change. Ulman’s cultural 
world was that of Leibnitz, Wolff, and Mendelssohn, the ambiance of 
the German Haskalah, with which he identified even from his self-
imposed exile in far-away Holland. Hurwitz was of a different make-up. 
While he knew of Mendelssohn and his philosophical contemporaries, 
he had chosen an entirely different intellectual trajectory-a passion for 
Lurianic kabbalah merged with an appreciation and commitment to the 
study of the natural world. Not Wolff nor Leibnitz but Kant inspired 
him. And Maimonides, the quintessential medieval Jewish philosopher, 
excited him far less than his self-proclaimed spiritual mentors Isaac Luria 
and Hayyim Vital of Safed. The interval of a mere sixteen years had 
utterly altered the intellectual landscape of the Jewish cultural world 
judging from the fascinating intellectual products of these two Hebraic 
scholars who nearly encountered each other in the Jewish neighborhood 
of the Hague. 
Historians should not engage in hypotheticals regarding what might 
have happened had two historical figures encountered each other. But in 
the case of Ulman and Hurwitz, two scholars who happened to reside in 
the same place nearly at the same time, the first for at least a decade and 
a half and the second for at least a year, their literary legacies offer ample 
information to reconstruct what a conversation between them might 
have sounded like. Far removed from the cultural centers of Berlin, 
 Krakow, or Vilna, The Hague might appear an unlikely cultural setting 
in monitoring a critical transition in modern Jewish thought, an evolu-
tion one might label: from Wolffian metaphysics to Kabbalistic natural 
science. Neither Ulman nor Hurwitz ever attained the elite status of 
primary intellectual figures in the history of modern Jewish thought that 
would certainly include the likes of Mendelssohn, Maimon, and other 
important luminaries of the German Haskalah. But they remain fasci-
nating secondary figures of Jewish self-reflection, and when considered 
together engaged in a ‘virtual’ conversation or, at least, when their intel-
lectual postures are contrasted with each other, they help to illuminate 
seismic shifts in the cultural world of European Jewry at the end of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While this transitional period 
is usually charted through Mendelssohn, his children and disciples and 
adversaries, primarily in Germany, an examination of the thinking of these 
less studied and admittedly more marginal figures of modern Jewish 
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intellectual history, might yet offer a meaningful indicator of how sub-
stantially Jewish cultural life was changing in this pivotal era. It also might 
properly set the stage to consider the content and impact of Hurwitz’s 
best-selling book on several generations of Jewish readers to follow. So I 
label this essay ‘The Hague Dialogues,’ a conversation that most likely 
never took place, although the following reconstruction of a meeting of 
the minds of these two thinkers seems quite plausible in the light of their 
extensive literary remains.
The Need for Rabbinic Approbations
We might begin our comparison of Ulman and his younger contempo-
rary Hurwitz by perusing the openings of each of their published vol-
umes. The title page of Hokhmat ha-shorashim, published by two local 
printers Loeb ben Moses Soesmans and J.H. Munnikhuisen, with the 
financial support of four local Jewish patrons,6 indicates immediately 
that wisdom of the roots of knowledge represents the first science of 
metaphysics and serves as an introduction to the volumes that follow: 
wisdom of the world, the soul, and finally the divine. Having prepared 
volumes on each of these topics as well as other works, Ulman had obvi-
ously imagined that this initial publication of 1781 would be followed by 
more. Perhaps one reason for the lack of the book’s financial success and 
his failure to publish any subsequent volumes can be found in this initial 
statement of the author:
I apologize in publishing this book for having abandoned the custom 
of most writers of our times in approaching the famous, brilliant, and 
wise rabbis who sit in learned counsel, teachers of the Torah in the 
land of Holland where I presently reside to seek their permission and 
approval of this publication. I justify this on two grounds. First, 
something that is made clear by decisive proof which is the case for all 
the studies discussed in this book is complete and self-evident truth 
and requires no formal approval. Would it not be ridiculous, for 
example, to declare that the three angles of a triangle represent more 
than two sides of a perpendicular just because a famous person gave 
his approval of this statement? Second, these rabbis who are famed 
6. See Irene Zwiep, ‘Jewish Enlightenment Reconsidered: The Dutch Eighteenth Century’, 
in Fontaine, Schatz, and Zwiep, Sepharad in Askenaz, p. 297. 
 THE HAGUE DIALOGUES 225
throughout the land as our teachers and sages are so burdened with 
Torah and divine commandments and with their profound and expert 
investigations of heavenly law and religious observance that they have 
no spare time to contemplate the wonders of nature and the secrets of 
the divine through self-reflection. The only demonstrative proof for 
them is revealed tradition as it is for the majority of loyal and faithful 
Jews…7
Ulman’s sarcastic and belligerent stance towards the rabbis of his genera-
tion in justifying his decision to ignore any rabbinic haskamah for his 
book could not have endeared him to them and their loyal constituencies 
who might have been potential purchasers of his Hebrew tome. On the 
contrary, he was both rejecting their authority in understanding the 
truth and he was also claiming that the study of nature had no place in 
their own curriculum of sacred study. In this he openly declared that the 
only authentic expositors of the truth were philosophers like himself, 
[Note his own self-designation from the opening title: ‘Torah scholar, 
naturalist [mehandes] and exalted philosopher’),8 and only such scholars 
were capable of leading the Jewish community in these confused and 
troubling times. 
How different was the strategy of Hurwitz’s Sefer ha-Brit! It would 
appear that Hurwitz went to great lengths to solicit seven rabbinic haska-
mot during the early 1790s, including four from Holland: Rabbi Saul 
Loewenstamm, rabbi of the Ashkenazic community of Amsterdam; 
Rabbi David Azevado, rabbi of the Sephardic community of the same 
city; Rabbi Aryeh Leib Breslau, rabbi of Rotterdam; the aforementioned 
Rabbi Judah Leib Mezerich of the Hague; Rabbi Isaac ha-Levi of Lem-
berg, rabbi of Krakow; Rabbi Moses Mintz of Brod, rabbi of Oven 
(Ofen=Buda), and Rabbi Isaac Abraham the rabbi of Pintshov (Pinczow). 
Hurwitz had apparently lobbied hard for these rabbinic approbations. 
When approaching Rabbi Loewenstamm of Amsterdam, he brought 
with him a letter of introduction from the latter’s own brother, Rabbi 
Zevi Hirsch, the rabbi of Berlin. Rabbi Azevado surely knew of Rabbi 
7. Naphtali Herz Ulman, Sefer Hokhmat ha-shorashim (The Hague 1781), p. 1a. Alexander 
Even-Chen translated this passage in his doctoral thesis mentioned in note 2 above, English abstract, 
p. 11-12. I have tried to improve this translation above. The passage is also discussed by Shmuel 
Feiner in The Jewish Enlightenment (Philadelphia 2003), p. 71-73. 
8. Sefer Hokhmat ha-shorashim, title page. 
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Loewenstamm’s support for Hurwitz’ book as he mentioned that he was 
writing his own approbation during the mourning period for his recently 
deceased colleague who had just died on June 19, 1790. Rabbi Mezerich 
had been ordained by Rabbi Loewenstamm and was surely inclined to 
follow in his footsteps in writing this approbation. Rabbi Isaac ha-Levi 
of Krakow was the son-in law of Rabbi Aryeh Leib Breslau of Rotterdam 
and was surely in contact with him. In short, Hurwitz had apparently 
chosen his seven rabbis carefully. Despite the distances from Eastern 
Europe to Holland, these were rabbis connected to each other and, at least 
in some cases, simply followed the lead of their associates in granting 
rabbinic approval of Hurwitz’s book.9
Hurwitz’s motivation in enlisting the support of these rabbinic 
authorities was surely related to their privileged place within traditional 
Jewish society. In contrast to Ulman, who consciously maligned these 
figures by making fun of their authority and knowledge, Hurwitz knew 
fully well that he needed haskamot to sell his book among traditional 
Jews. Furthermore, he assumed that if each of these rabbis would issue a 
warning prohibiting anyone from republishing the book for fifteen years 
without the permission of the author, he would be relatively protected to 
pursue his own publishing interests and reap any profits exclusively for 
himself. To his utter surprise, this expectation was not realized. Despite 
the rabbinic threats mentioned in the approbations, a pirated edition of 
Sefer ha-Brit appeared in 1801 and the publisher seemed to ignore the 
rabbis altogether, removing their approbations from his own edition. 
They were restored in Hurwitz’s new and expanded edition of his book 
in 1807 which included a new introduction in which Hurwitz expressed 
his utter disgust over the sheer disregard by the rogue publisher in ignor-
ing these rabbis who had supported his publishing endeavor.10 In short, 
9. Hurwitz, Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 4-7 [Arabic numerals). On Loewenstamm, see Zwiep. 
‘Jewish Enlightenment Reconsidered,’ p. 293, 300. On Azevedo, see Jozeph Michman, History of 
Dutch Jewry during the Emancipation Period, 1787-1815: Gothic Turrets on a Corinthian Building 
(Amsterdam 1995), p. 125 and on Breslau, see Michman, History of Dutch Jewry, p. 153. On Meze-
rich, see Stefan Litt, Pinkas, Kahal, and the Mediene: the Records of Dutch Ashkenazi Communities in 
the Eighteenth Century as Historical Sources (Leiden 2008), p. 124. On R. Isaac Ha-Levi of Lemberg, 
rabbi of Krakow and his family connection with the rabbi of Rotterdam, see Majer Balaban, Toldot 
ha-Yehudim bi-Krakov uve-Kaz’imyez’, 1304-1868 (Jerusalem 2002) 2 vols, 2:807. 
10. Hurwitz discusses the whole sordid affair of the pirated edition (1801) of the publisher 
Joseph Rossmann and his plan to revise and expand the book in the introduction to the second 
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in the mind of Hurwitz, rabbinic approbations were still important in 
selling books, in both providing religious approval of his message and in 
protecting him from illicit publishing practices that would harm his 
authorial rights. When this proved not to be the case, Hurwitz not only 
excoriated the man who had stolen his book; he singled out this practice 
again at the end of Sefer ha-Brit in a broader social critique of the Jewish 
community of his day.11
On Metaphysics
In the same year that Ulman published his introduction to Jewish meta-
physics or what he called ‘The Wisdom of that which is Beyond Nature’,12 
Immanuel Kant published his Critique of Pure Reason [1781].13 Ironically, 
at the moment Ulman was conceiving his major project of a Jewish phi-
losophy based on the principles of Leibnitz and Wolff, Kant had initi-
ated a direct assault on the very core assumptions informing their philo-
sophic project. Whether or not Ulman deviated from his mentors in 
some of his specific formulations, he was clearly indebted to their core 
ideas and viewed his enterprise as a specific Jewish adaptation of their 
vital contributions to philosophical thinking. Even a superficial perusal 
of his ambitious composition reveals both indebtedness to the overall 
structures of their works as well as a specific employment of their work-
ing hypotheses such as the principles of contradiction, of sufficient rea-
son, of the best and most perfect worlds, as well as a description and 
defense of the existence of monads.14 
Leaving aside the intricacies of Ulman’s specific interpretations of 
Leibnitz and Wolff, I wish to stress in this context Ulman’s unwavering 
commitment to the enterprise of metaphysical thinking in general which 
he derived from his teachers. Right from the beginning of Hokhmat 
edition, Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 18-20. This introduction first appeared in the Zokiew edition of 
1806-07 of A. Meir Hapfer. 
11. See Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 555. 
12. Ulman, Sefer Hokhmat ha-shorashim, title page. 
13. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Verrnunft (Riga 1781). 
14. For a philosophical study of Ulman’s work in relation to the philosophies of Leibnitz and 
Wolff, see Even-Chen’s dissertation mentioned in note 2 above. Succinct summaries with up-to-date 
bibliographies of the two German philosophers can be found in on the online Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy edited by Edward N. Zalta. 
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ha-shorashim, he underscored the need for philosophical reflection in 
determining first principles and in organizing human knowledge. He was 
certainly aware of those detractors of philosophical metaphysics both 
from within the traditionalist as well as within the rational camps but 
aggressively sought to deflect their criticisms. For Ulman, metaphysics 
was fundamental to human understanding; faulty principles yield bad 
knowledge and ultimately harm society. Ulman readily conceded that 
Greek and Arabic philosophy from Plato and Aristotle had made invalid 
assumptions but nevertheless the search for meaning beyond and behind 
nature is still valid. Metaphysical thinking is neither impractical nor dry. 
Without a systematic undergirding of philosophical principles, human 
society is cast into doubt and heresy, and for Jews, the meaning of the 
Torah is put in jeopardy. What the Jewish community requires is a new 
paradigm of philosophical metaphysics based on Leibnitz and Wolff and 
a moral commitment to fathom the ontological basis of reality rigorously 
and sincerely. Sensory knowledge alone cannot sufficiently make sense 
of the infinite variety of things in nature without recourse to fundamen-
tal rational assumptions.15
Hurwitz would have strongly objected to this line of thinking.
He would have particularly found offensive Ulman’s declaration at the 
very beginning of Hokhmat ha-shorashim that anyone who assumes it is 
impossible to know truth except through prophecy and kabbalah is com-
pletely mistaken and relies only on the stubbornness of his views.16 The 
proofs of ‘science’ undermine his claims. For this indeed was the exact 
position Hurwitz came to champion. From the very beginning of his 
Hebrew writing, he saw the kabbalah as the ultimate source of all truth 
and the foundation of the Jewish faith and he saw his primary intellec-
tual role as an expositor of the kabbalistic tradition. Indeed the Sefer 
ha-Brit was merely an elaborate extension of interpreting kabbalistic 
sapience for a wide Jewish readership. For Hurwitz, philosophy, both in 
the past and in his own times, generally lead to skepticism and heresy, 
denying the foundations of Jewish faith. Indeed for Hurwitz, only 
through faith, and not rational investigation can a Jew know God: ‘It is 
not God’s desire … that we will know the Lord our God through human 
15. Sefer Hokhmat ha-shorashim, p. 2a-17b. 
16. Ibid., p. 1b. 
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investigation and acquired proof … for God wants from his people that 
they believe in him based on our tradition from our forefathers, genera-
tion after generation back to those who stood on Mount Sinai.’ 17
In a move radically opposed to the position of Ulman, Hurwitz 
declared that the entire philosophical enterprise was antithetical to Juda-
ism. Philosophy was the creation of the Greeks beginning with Solon, 
Socrates, and Aristotle. The Arabs then took this tradition and transmit-
ted it to Christian Europe. From the Moslems and the Christians certain 
Jews mastered philosophy and wrapped themselves in ‘a stolen tallit’.18 
Despite the attraction of philosophy for some Jewish thinkers, most 
notably Maimonides, philosophical study was never incumbent upon 
Jews and does not lead to knowledge of God. The latter can only be 
reached, following the formulation of Judah ha-Levi, by the observance of 
the divine commandments and by experiencing the world to its fullest. 
Wisdom is not a function of rational investigation but faith and under-
standing and appreciating the natural world, the wondrous creations of 
the Divine: ‘A thing is more certain acquired through achievement and 
experience than one acquired through human investigation as the elder 
sages declare: “There is no wiser person than one of experience.”’19
In almost revelatory terms, Hurwitz dramatically announced the 
publication of Kant’s devastating critique of metaphysics in 1781. In 
Hurwitz’s words, the book appeared not only to undermine ancient phi-
losophy but also ‘the most recent philosophers of this generation … and 
their theoretical proofs regarding the reality beyond nature called meta-
physics.’ Furthermore, Kant explicitly pointed to ‘the books of the great 
philosopher Wolff and the famous philosopher Leibnitz who are the 
most publicized recent philosophers’ describing their intellectual systems 
as children’s toys made of paper and carton easily blown away in the 
wind. For Hurwitz, Kant’s challenge to metaphysics was devastating; all 
philosophical proofs are mere figments of thought and imagination 
unconnected to reality. Kant demonstrated unequivocally that human 
17. Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 324. 
18. Ibid., p. 330. On the powerful tradition in Jewish thought Hurwitz was emphatically 
undermining, see Abraham Melamed, The Myth of the Jewish Origins of Science and Philosophy 
(Jerusalem 2010). 
19. Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 344. 
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beings lack the means to know, based on either the senses or rational 
investigation, what is beyond nature.20
Hurwitz added that the attempt of the contemporary Jewish phi-
losopher Salomon Maimon to defend the foundations of philosophy was 
for naught. Hurwitz associated Maimon’s defense with a justification 
of Leibnitz’s theory of monads which have no basis in reality and were 
invented in Leibnitz’s mind. Hurwitz acknowledged the many followers 
of Leibniz but considered Kant’s disbelief as the ultimate vindication 
that such metaphysical assumptions were nothing more than deceptive 
vanities. With the shattering of the truth claims of the school of Leibnitz 
and Wolff, the door was open to embrace a metaphysics based on kab-
balistic assumptions constituting the true faith of Judaism, one philo-
sophically informed by Kant’s latest critique and aligned with an empir-
icist appreciation of nature and the physical world known through 
human experience.21 
The explicit reference by Hurwitz to Kant’s challenge to Leibnitz 
and Wolff underscores the widening gulf between Ulman and Hurwitz. 
While Ulman suffered the fate of defending an epistemological system 
already under siege by the time he had completed most of his writing, 
Hurwitz greatly benefited by the timeliness of Kant’s challenge to met-
aphysics and his attempt to limit human investigation to the natural 
world. Through Kant, Hurwitz had discovered a convincing strategy of 
combining natural philosophy with kabbalistic metaphysics. In this vital 
conflict over the place of philosophy in Judaism, Hurwitz had found a 
remarkably effective ally from within the very cohorts of recent philosophy 
from whom he intended to distance himself.
On Interpreting the Wonders of Nature
In one of his many compositions left in manuscript, Naphtali Ulman 
described an incredible invention in the home of an affluent Jew from 
Amsterdam named Jacob Heimfeld. The invention was an elaborate 
20. Ibid., p. 360-361. 
21. Ibid., p. 362-363. Hurwitz cited the opening of Salomon Maimon’s Givat ha-moreh (Jeru-
salem 1965), p. 18 (First edition, Berlin 1791). For a fine summary of Maimon’s philosophy with 
up-to-date bibliographies, see Peter Thielke and Yitzhak Melamed, ‘Salamon Maimon’ in the online 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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clock which he called a horologe. From it a sculpted figure would emerge 
every half hour accompanied by music. The music was so accurate that 
it was indistinguishable from that of a live musician. Similarly, Ulman 
reported on other such clocks where figures of stone or wood emerged 
on the hour hitting a stick to indicate the precise time; with each appear-
ance a door would open and then shut as the figure entered and exited.22 
Ulman remarked that such an incredible sight could easily be per-
ceived as a miracle of nature but in fact represents a daily natural occur-
rence happening with growing regularity in the author’s age. In fact, 
such phenomena are also recorded regularly in history books and testify 
to the fact that what many people perceive to be miracles are actually 
based on natural causation. Ulman was aware of those who would chal-
lenge this position claiming that biblical miracles were often intended to 
punish the wicked and reward the righteous and that nature never dis-
tinguishes between right and wrong and privileges one group of people 
over another. But this view, argued Ulman, can actually be refuted by 
several historical examples. In 1349, the Jews were less victimized by the 
black plague than Christians. At other times, women perished more than 
men in times of war. One also finds remarkable parallels between sup-
posed biblical miracles such as the crossing of the sea of reeds, Sarah’s 
pregnancy in old age, the rapid rise in Israel’s population in Egypt 
and more. Such occurrences do not happen often and when they do 
occur often astonish human observers, but they are still natural in origin. 
Just because one is unfamiliar with such phenomena does not entitle 
him to label them as miraculous. Scripture accordingly does not record 
irrational and illogical things. A good natural philosopher aware of the 
limitless possibilities within nature can ultimately explain and interpret 
all of the so-called miracles recorded therein.23 
Ulman’s strong claim was directed against the traditionalist rabbis 
of his generation who assumed that every naturalist was an unbeliever 
and that the only strategy to challenge those who denied the miraculous 
was to retreat into a biblical literalism and fundamentalism. Ulman offered 
an alternative to reconcile God, providence and nature. The naturalist 
22. Naphtali Herz Ulman, Ma’amar selah ha-hahloket, Ms. Leiden Hebrew 86/2, part 2, 
fol. 146a. 
23. Ibid., fols 147b-153b. 
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does not deny miracles; he simply tries to understand them within a 
naturalistic context. The comet was often perceived as a miracle by those 
who had not studied the laws of astronomy but the scientist knows that 
they are part of nature. The philosophers like him are actually true believ-
ers-opposed to charlatans within the Jewish community who deceive and 
manipulate the masses with their pretentious claims to be miracle work-
ers, on the one hand, and to deist and atheist philosophers who deny the 
veracity of Holy Scripture, on the other.24 
The true hero is what Ulman calls ‘the Torah philosopher’ who 
acknowledges revelation about nature but tries to offer a rational hypoth-
esis as close to the truth as possible. In this respect, Ulman mentions the 
well-publicized debate between Pierre Bayle and Gottfried Leibniz. The 
former had firmly distinguished between a truth of nature from that of 
Scripture, divorcing one from the other and thus legitimating all faith 
claims through this epistemological fire wall. Siding with his mentor 
Leibniz, Ulman argued that reason and faith ultimately do not contra-
dict each other; rather they complement each other since God is the source 
of both. The implications for the Jewish community are thus clear: ‘Every 
wise Jew must attempt to understand through truthful reasoning all the 
biblical passages in the Holy Books, to interpret them so they do not 
appear irrational and accordingly seem possible and truthful, or at least 
it is his obligation to exert himself to understand from his intelligence 
that there is no real contradiction embedded in them.’25 
Proving that the Bible is a repository of natural phenomena, that 
miracles don’t exist and can be explained rationally, and that the role of 
‘the Torah philosopher’ is to reconcile the scientific and the sacred were 
objectives Hurwitz would have found disconcerting. At first glance this 
might appear odd to the casual observer of Hurwitz’s massive encyclopedia 
of the sciences, offering a comprehensive view of astronomy, the earth 
sciences, and human biology. Had not Hurwitz promoted his project of 
24. These themes are developed in Ulman’s Hokhmat ha-olam, Ms. Leiden Hebrew 87a, 
especially fols 143a-147b. 
25. Naphtali Herz Ulman, Hokhmat ha-Elohut, Ms. Leiden Hebrew 87/d, part 2, fol. 105a. 
The Bayle-Leibnitz debate that took place between 1695-99 is referred to on fol. 70a. On this con-
troversy see, for example, David F. Norton, ‘Leibniz and Bayle: Manicheism and Dialectic’, Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 2 (1964), p. 23-36; Paul Lodge and Benjamin Crowe, ‘Leibniz, Bayle, 
and Locke on Faith and Reason’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2002), p. 575-600. 
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pious science to integrate knowledge of the natural world with divine 
revelation? Why would he object to Ulman’s ideal that all the narratives 
of the Torah can be interpreted to demonstrate the regularity and ration-
ality of nature and support a scientific understanding of divine creation? 
But indeed Hurwitz’s motivation in teaching science to pious Jews was 
not identical to that of Ulman. 
In the first place, there was only one source of truth for Hurwitz and 
that was the revelation at Sinai and specifically its deeper meaning as 
revealed in the kabbalah. Human beings unaided by divine revelation are 
in no position of knowing the truth through their own devices. This is 
especially the case for metaphysical knowledge, as we have seen, but it
is also true for knowledge of the natural world. Natural philosophers 
could certainly provide a general orientation on how to understand the 
universe and God’s creation, but their understanding was incomplete 
and tentative. They could never understand all the secrets of nature 
which are revealed over time and constantly challenge and overturn the 
rational paradigms that philosophers had previously held in explaining 
the natural world.
What was the ultimate meaning of recent scientific discoveries such 
as the helium balloon, the barometer, or the divers’ bell that Hurwitz 
presented to his readers in the pages of Sefer ha-Brit? On the one hand, 
they convey a sense of wonderment, majesty, and inspiration in the 
beneficence of God’s presence in the world, echoing the biblical senti-
ments of how the heavens declare God’s glory or how from human flesh, 
God is revealed. But they accomplish something else as well for Hurwitz. 
They upset and destabilize the orderly systems of human knowledge 
based on long-standing rational assumptions and intense human scru-
tiny of nature. In the chance occurrences in which nature operates and 
in its seeming indifference to supposed rules and norms by which it is 
expected to function according to human calculation, it ultimately 
undermines the assumption that humans can fully understand anything 
and that human knowledge can reliably fathom God’s handiwork. 
At several points in his text, Hurwitz paused to take account of the 
utter confusion scientific discoveries often render. One such example 
was the seemingly unwavering assumptions that the earth was composed 
of four elements but more recently challenged by the chemical philoso-
phers who insisted that there were five. It is not that the later scientists 
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were smarter than the earlier ones, Hurwitz claimed, only ‘that experi-
ence came and denied their words and overturned their opinions. What 
happened to these earlier scholars will also happen to later ones of this 
generation who will not be happy. Thus in the end of days discoveries 
will be revealed that are now hidden even though recent instruments are 
available to make these new discoveries and they will ultimately overturn 
the views of the scholars of this generation…And in another generation, 
all that was assumed will be erased for their children will arise after them 
who will discover wonderful and clearer instruments and discoveries 
which will deny their [parents’] words. Everything they agreed on will be 
destroyed with arguments based on philosophical logic built on wings of 
human speculation. All the external sciences serve divine religion and are 
slaves to the divine Torah and one should not have faith in slaves … So 
all the external sciences are distant from truth except mathematics and 
geometry and all the rest are swept away in a wind of vanity and lack the 
vitality to approach the truth.’26
In contrast to the emphatic assumption of Ulman that philosophers 
can establish a relatively stable and reliable system of metaphysical and 
physical truth and that this can be made compatible with the utterances 
of the Torah, Hurwitz saw the study of nature from an entirely different 
vantage point. The more one learns of nature and the ways scientists 
work, the more one realizes how tentative and fallible human knowledge 
and experience are. Empiricism reveals the severe limitations of human 
understanding and bolsters the sense of awe and bewilderment critical to 
an unquestioning faith in God. Even the vaunted Maimonides in his 
depiction of Moses as a prophet who had supposedly acquired all knowl-
edge had gotten it wrong according to Hurwitz. There is no end to 
knowledge since ‘in every generation new wisdom and understanding is 
revealed which were unknown to earlier scholars’. Thus the designation 
‘wise man’ is only relative pertaining to the knowledge accumulated in a 
particular era and not in general. In the end, science demonstrates nei-
ther the mastery of nature by humans nor the veracity of their rational 
investigations but the opposite. The more discoveries science uncovers, 
the more mysterious the divine handiwork appears. The more we think 
we understand about the world, the more we appreciate how much we 
26. Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 189. Compare also p. 311 and 324. 
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do not know. Scientific discoveries accordingly serve to make human 
beings more uncertain about their own capacities and more dependent 
on divine providence and on the faith of their ancestors.27 
The Scholar and the Community
In one important respect, Ulman and Hurwitz shared one common 
characteristic: a deep and passionate concern for the welfare of their 
community and an abiding sense of their capabilities as educators to
lead their constituencies in the right intellectual and spiritual direction. 
But despite this shared concern, the results of their concerted efforts to 
influence their communities, even to be noticed at all, are conspicuously 
different. Ulman died a lonely and embittered intellectual, feeling 
ignored and ineffectual in shaping a meaningful cultural agenda for the 
Jewish community. Hurwitz died a best-selling author whose aggressive 
marketing of his book solidly paid off. Despite his modest origins, his 
encyclopedia became one of the most popular books among traditional 
Jewish readers, especially in Eastern Europe. He had connected to a 
readership Ulman never dreamed of reaching. Their reflections on Jew-
ish communal life, their self-image as Jewish educators, and the ultimate 
impact of their writing offer a final insight into this collective portrait of 
these two thinkers who almost met each other.
Naphtali Ulman’s writings, especially those in manuscript reveal an 
arrogant and sour temperament. His provocative justification of omit-
ting rabbinic approbations to his book is only one small indicator of 
his condescending tone. In various places in his writing, he complains 
about the poor rabbinic leadership of the community and its ignorance 
which make Jews look stupid in the eyes of non-Jews. These leaders are 
‘children with respect to their intelligence and grown-up with respect to 
doing evil, always ready to harm good people among us to the extent 
they are able. They enjoy this role and they consider this a way of 
enhancing their worship of the almighty God.’28 In contrast Ulman 
strived from his early youth, so he claimed, to do the right thing and to 
lead people in the proper direction based on sound principles of reason. 
27. Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 463. 
28. Naphtali Herz Ulman, Ma’amar ha-Yihud, Ms. Leiden Hebrew 88, fol. 4a. 
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He acknowledged the earlier contributions of Sephardic scholars who 
wrote philosophy but unlike the philosophers of his day, their work 
remains obscure and incomplete and thus Ulman decided to undertake 
a mission to finish their work. But his message was ignored or rebuffed 
and these terrible leaders exiled such rational learning from the commu-
nity so that the Jewish people have become an embarrassment before the 
world. Publishing a book in Dutch as well, Ulman attempted to defend 
philosophical study among his people based on traditional texts and philo-
sophical analysis. But his challenge to the communal leadership went 
unanswered and no one even acknowledged his singular contribution.29
The major targets of Ulman’s stinging barbs were the Hasidim of 
his generation who obscured the teachings of the Torah in their riddles 
and metaphors, hinting to hidden secrets which never existed. Their 
emotional piety has replaced serious rational inquiry and they were dan-
gerous to Judaism since piety without honest investigation is not piety at 
all, claimed Ulman. His most biting and sarcastic observations of these 
and other Jewish leaders is found in a small composition called Maaseh 
Tartuffe, whose title was obviously borrowed from Molière’s play. 
The manuscript, copied by a person who had listened to an oral 
presentation of Ulman, offers a large inventory of alleged hypocrites 
among the Jewish people. They include men who make spectacles of 
themselves, wearing larger prayer shawls, praying with their eyes closed, 
and raising their voices in prayer so that they might be noticed. After 
prayer, they read from a kabbalistic book, making scary sounds and 
motions while recounting ridiculous stories and dream visions. They 
reveal excessive concern for halakhic minutia while ignoring the serious 
Torah scholar. They are arrogant, bad-mouthed, and run after money, 
food, and drink. They honor only the rich and ignore the poor. They 
hide their ignorance by responding to their critics with aggressiveness 
and anger just as Catholic priests act in vilifying Jews. Ulman’s enemies 
surely included more than Hasidim – they comprise all leaders who were 
illiterate, immoral and displayed their bad qualities in destroying the 
social fabric of Jewish society.30 
29. Ibid., fols 4a-6b; Ms. Leiden Heb. 126, fols 5a-5b. On Ulman’s Dutch book, see the essay 
by Van Lieburg mentioned above in note 2. 
30. Naphtali Herz Ulman, Ma’aseh ha-Tartuffe be-lashon Ivrit, Ms. New York JTSA 10169. 
This short pamphlet was copied in The Hague in 1776 by Israel ben Samuel Falk after hearing this 
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By composing such a diatribe against members of the Jewish com-
munity, Ulman openly displayed his anger and utter frustration for the 
intellectual and social morass he imagined into which the Jewish com-
munity had fallen. But there was more to his critique that mere vitu-
peration. For Ulman there was a way out if only the community would 
embrace him and philosophers like him, community-minded and mor-
ally conscious who cared genuinely about the fate of his people. What 
leaders required at this moment of crisis, Ulman contended, were intel-
lectuals armed with knowledge of philosophy and history as well as the 
medieval philosophers. Only they could face up to the intellectual chal-
lenges of their day both within the Jewish community and beyond it. 
Ulman saw himself a champion of the Jews similar to the tenth-century 
Saadia who successfully combated the Karaites, the enemies of rabbinic 
Judaism. Philosophy, he finally pleaded, was not the enemy of the Jewish 
community but immoral behavior and bad character were. The sermon 
copied in 1776 in The Hague closes with the following: ‘These are the 
words of the bitter and sad… Naphtali called Herz Ulman of Mainz.’
Pinhas Hurwitz also had his enemies and was not reluctant to casti-
gate them in print beginning with the publisher who had released a 
pirated edition of his book. He also attacked deists and atheists such as 
Voltaire and Spinoza and he was particularly enraged by such radical 
maskilim, especially Saul Berlin and Isaac Satanov, who masked their 
heretical views in traditionally sounding rabbinic writing, misleading 
and confusing a naïve community of readers.31 Hurwitz did not openly 
attack the Hasidim but only the followers of Shabbetai Zevi and its 
 leaders Abraham Cardoso, Nehemiah Hayon, and Berakhiah Russo, who 
undermined the very foundations of the Jewish faith and sullied the good 
name of the Jewish community among their neighbors. Furthermore, 
the Sabbateans had given a bad odor to the kabbalah itself, confusing a 
pure and sacred lore with their heretical notions.32 
Hurwitz, like Ulman, also offered his own social criticism against 
certain practices he personally observed in the community. He decried 
those Jews who refused to teach their children an honest living and 
sermon by Ulman. My thanks to Professor Reinier Munk for supplying me with a copy of the 
manuscript. 
31. See, for example, Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 52, 358, 360. 
32. See, for example, Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 76, 375, and 520. 
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expected them to study the Torah alone. He was offended by the class of 
lazy itinerant and penniless scholars who refused to involve themselves 
in productive labor. He also criticized the rich for their ostentation and 
for ignoring their social responsibilities. He offered a catalogue of moral 
excesses of his day including jealousy, lust, frivolous conversation, and 
pride, but especially singling out the senseless hatred between Ashkenazim 
and Sephardim.33
The apparent similarities between Ulman and Hurwitz regarding 
their visions of Jewish life are obvious. Both displayed a strong impulse 
to address social ills and to provide moral leadership to their communi-
ties. They were also alike in their mission to inculcate a new intellectual 
agenda through their books and teaching – in the case of Ulman, a new 
metaphysics and in the case of Hurwitz, a fresh accounting of natural 
philosophy and scientific discoveries. But in the end, they remained 
worlds apart. Ulman departed the earth ‘a bitter and sad’ man, frustrated 
by the gap between his high expectations of himself and his inability to 
impact the community he wished to educate. In the end, he suffered his 
own marginalization and alienation from the community by lashing out 
at his supposed enemies through bitter sarcasm and castigation of its 
spiritual and political leaders. In contrast, Hurwitz constructed a mes-
sage that was uplifting, personal, and spiritual. The style of Sefer ha-Brit 
was engaging and charming. He invited his readers in to experience both 
a journey through the wonders of nature as well as an ascent to the mys-
teries of encountering the divine spirit itself. Along the way, he addressed 
them directly, encouraged them to read his book in the proper order, 
patiently leading them from point to point, from subject to subject.
In the end, the encounter with the outside world was skillfully conjoined 
with a mystical and moral aura. Natural philosophy was wrapped in the 
garments of Torah and all led to the ultimate revelation of the divine 
which was the culmination of prophecy itself. Ulman hated the Hasi-
dim while Hurwitz never mentioned them explicitly. And ironically his 
book was received with great passion by Hasidim and Mitnagdim alike. 
It became a kind of holy book embedded within the traditionalist camp 
rather than outside it. In the final analysis, it was not only Ulman’s 
metaphysical assumptions that were out of style with a new age; it was 
33. Sefer ha-Brit ha-shalem, p. 522-524, 537-545, 569. 
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also his rage, his impatience with displays of piety, and his indifference 
to the spiritual needs of those he wished to serve that left his intellectual 
project almost totally forgotten in the end. Ulman’s works, unread 
and unpublished, provide clear testimony to his failure as an educator 
and writer. And Hurwitz, the consummate salesman and entrepreneur, 
better understood his role: to entertain and to inspire in providing a 
powerful bridge between natural philosophy and musar, between intel-
lectual edification and moral and spiritual improvement. The combination 
proved to be his greatest success.
